United States. Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction

• Actions needed to better assess and coordinate capacity-building efforts at the Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation, and Livestock
• Afghan First initiative has placed work with Afghan companies, but is affected by inconsistent contract solicitation and vetting, and employment data is limited
• Afghan National Security University has experienced cost growth and schedule delays, and contract administration needs improvement
• Afghan Special Mission Wing
• Afghanistan's High Office of Oversight needs significantly strengthened authority, independence, and donor support to become an effective anti-corruption institution
• Afghanistan's National Solidarity Program has reached thousands of Afghan communities, but faces challenges that could limit outcomes
• ANA facilities at Mazar-e-Sharif and Herat generally met construction requirements, but contractor oversight should be strengthened
• Better planning and oversight could have reduced construction delays and costs at the Kabul Military Training Center
• C-JTSCC has taken steps to improve the accuracy of its contract data, but it should assess the feasibility of correcting data for fiscal year 2009 and earlier
• Commander's Emergency Response Program in Laghman Province provided some benefits, but oversight weaknesses and sustainment concerns led to questionable outcomes and potential waste
• Despite improvements in MoI's personnel systems additional actions are needed to completely verify ANP payroll costs and workforce strength
• DOD improved its accountability for vehicles provided to the Afghan national security forces, but should follow up on end-use monitoring findings