The "Nazi Menace" in Argentina, 1931-1947

It also penetrates the maze of forgeries, propaganda, and assorted "dirty tricks" propagated by both the Allies and the Axis, thus providing a factual account of clandestine activities during the war years, and the alleged movement of Nazi war criminals and treasure to Argentina at the war's end. Among the author's major findings are that Germany in fact had no strategic designs on Argentina, but saw it as a market for export sales and a source of raw materials; that the response of German-Argentines and Argentines in general to Nazism was limited and dictated mostly by opportunism; and that both the British and Argentine governments took the measure of the German challenge calmly and rationally, and that it was the United States that became alarmed over the "Nazi menace." Despite what the author demonstrates were the reckless and foolish activities of Nazi agents, the U.S. government and media were ignorant and gullible concerning Argentina