Tropes

Properties and objects are present all over the world. We cannot take a step without walking into them; we cannot construct a theory in science without referencing them. Given their ubiquitous character, one might think that there would be a standard metaphysical account of properties and objects, but properties and objects remain a philosophical mystery. In this book Douglas Ehring presents a defense of tropes and of trope bundle theory as the best accounts ofproperties and objects, and advocates a specific brand of trope nominalism, Natural Class Trope Nominalism. He pursues each of these tasks separately. The first Part of the book provides a general introduction and defense of tropes and trope bundle theory. Ehring demonstrates that there are tropesand indicates some of the things that tropes can do for us metaphysically, including helping to solve the problems of mental causation, while remaining neutral between different theories of tropes. In the second Part he offers a more specific defense of Natural Class Trope Nominalism, and provides a full analysis of what a trope is.